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The Globalization of Law
MARTIN SHAPIRO*

By globalization of law, we might refer to the degree to which the
whole world lives under a single set of legal rules. Such a single set of
rules might be imposed by a single coercive actor, adopted by global
consensus, or arrived at by parallel development in all parts of the globe.
Although the end of bipolarity and the cold war brings some comfort, surely
we have not moved very far toward a regime of international law either
through the establishment of a single global law giver and enforcer or
through a strong nation-state consensus. If we had, we would be speaking
of international law, not the globalization of law.
Nor can we even confidently claim that law has become global or
universal in the sense that everyone on the planet can be sure that wherever
he or she goes on the planet, human relationships will be governed by some
law, even if not by a law that is everywhere the same. Indeed, unless we
move very far toward an anthropological merging of law and custom, we
would probably conclude that a smaller proportion of the world's population
enjoys legally defined relationships today than it did one hundred years ago.
This retreat would have occurred on the basis of one great historical fact
alone: the enormous population of China has moved from a regime of
Imperial however thin and corrupted, to a Leninist regime of non-law.
Moreover, in much of the post-colonial third world, the legal regimes of the
colonial occupiers have been thrown out, but it has been impossible to
replace them with new legal regimes or restore the pre-colonial legal
regimes that the European imperialists disrupted. Indeed, if the Indian subcontinent and Indonesia could not be counted as having maintained some
kind of rule of law, we would confront a world in which the relative number
of persons living under regimes of law had declined so precipitously as to
render talk of the globalization of law entirely misleading. When we speak
of the globalization of law, we must be conscious that we are speaking of
an extremely narrow, limited, and specialized set of legal phenomena set
into a globe in which it is not at all clear whether the total quantum of
human relationships governed by law has increased or decreased over the
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last century. We will almost always discover that we are really talking
about North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan will
sometimes be on and sometimes off this globe. The rest of Asia and Africa
will almost never be seen, and, for most of us, Latin America south of
Mexico will be irrelevant. Indeed, much of the time, the globe will turn out
to be the U.S. and Western Europe with shadowy addenda.
I. GLOBALIZATION OF COMMERCIAL AND CONTRACT LAW1 AND THE
PROLIFERATION OF LAWYERS

2

We speak of globalization of law in reference to a number of
interrelated phenomena. As a concomitant of the globalization of markets
and the organization and business practices of the multi-national
corporations that operate in those markets, there has been some movement
toward a relatively uniform global contract and commercial law. It is
commonplace that, by their very nature, contracts are a kind of private
lawmaking system. The two or more contracting parties create a set of rules
to govern their future relationships. These are the various substantive
provisions of the contract. Such a system of private lawmaking can exist
transnationally even when there is no transnational court or transnational
sovereign to resolve disputes between the contracting parties and to enforce
those resolutions. The contracting parties may have specified in the contract
itself some nongovernmental arbitration mechanism or the courts of some
particular nation state, or both, to resolve contract disputes. Typically they
also specify the contract and commercial law of some particular country as
the law under which any contract dispute between them shall be resolved.
So long as the courts and law of individual nation states are available, and
the courts and law of each or most are prepared to recognize and enforce the
judgments of the others, a global commercial law can come into being by
private lawmaking. This event occurs when the standard incentives for
uniformity, predictability, and transparency of law that are at play in all
capitalist contract regimes move the substantial, but not enormous, number

1. See generally E. Paasivirta, Internationalizationand Stabilization of Contracts Versus State
Sovereignty, 60 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 315 (1989); A. Briggs, The Formationof InternationalContracts,
1990 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 192 (1990); M. Greenberg, InternationalContracts: Problems of
Draftingand Interpreting,and the Needfor Uniform JudicialApproaches, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 363 (1987).
2. 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel and Philip S.C. Lewis
eds., 1988).

1993]

THE GLOBALIZATION OF LAW

of significant multi-national, corporate, private lawmakers to generate a
relative uniform set of contract provisions. Thus, there emerges a global
commercial law independent of any global law giver or enforcer, although
dependent on national legal and judicial institutions already long in place.
Given the place of the United States in the world economy, this
globalization of law through private corporate lawmaking rather naturally
takes the form of the global Americanization of commercial law. Often
when we speak of globalization we mean that certain American legal
practices are being diffused throughout the world (for instance, the legal
device of franchising). It may be not only American economic power, but
some particular receptivity of common law to contract, and other
commercial law innovation that is the engine of globalization in this sense.
It is widely believed in Europe that European Community legal business
flows to London because English lawyers are more adept than civil law
lawyers at legal innovation to facilitate new and evolving transnational
business relationships. For whatever reasons, it is now possible to argue
that American business law has become a kind of global jus commune
incorporated explicitly or implicitly into transnational contracts and
beginning to be incorporated into the case law and even the statutes of many
other nations.'
After World War II, a long run of relatively steady economic growth,
the expansion of world trade, the communications and data processing
revolutions, and the mergers and acquisition movement of the 1980s
contributed to an enormous acceleration in business activity. More
transactions conducted more quickly necessarily leads to more lawyers and
more litigation if we choose law and lawyers as one of the means of
perfecting such transactions and resolving conflicts about them when we do
not achieve perfection.
One reason that choice was made has to do with enterprise organization.
In the period before and just after World War II, vertical integration was the
model of business organization. Vertical integration was the capitalist
equivalent of socialist central economic planning, for capitalists trusted
markets little more than socialists did. By bringing both suppliers and
primary customers "in house," large manufacturing enterprises would

3.
4.
(1991).

Martin Shapiro, JudicialActivism, in THE THIRD CENTURY (S.M. Lipset ed., 1979).
See Wolfgand Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229
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internalize and thus rationally coordinate the myriad of economic decisions
vital to their health that otherwise would be made in external, and thus
unpredictable and uncontrollable, markets. For reasons that I do not profess
to understand, but which are probably related to rapid and unpredictable
technological change and the expansion of international trade, business
theory changed some time after World War II. The vision of the
corporation as a rationalized, vertically integrated producer and marketer of
a single or complementary line of products was replaced by the vision of the
corporation as a bundle of capital and executive intelligence seeking profit
wherever and however it was to be found. The supposedly optimal business
organization changed from a closed one that emphasized clear boundaries
between the corporation and the rest of the world, together with an
irredentist attitude toward such boundaries, to an open one in which
boundaries were blurred. Whatever arrangement promised to maximize
profit (acquisition, joint venture, license, franchise, job shop, independent
contractor, subsidiary, spin-off, long-term supply contract, patent pool, or
bank coordinated interlocking financing) was the appropriate strategy.
Nothing was forever, or indeed, for very long. Not building the boundaries,
but pushing the envelope, became the corporate creed.
In the world of the vertically integrated firm as in the world of
socialism, economic relationships are determined by internal command. The
inter-office memo, rather than the contract, is the mode 6f communication.
Internal negotiation is among principals and is set in a hierarchical command
structure. In even the most decentralized participatory vertical firm,
democratic centralism is the most that is sought or could be achieved. In
such a firm there may be many rules, but there is little room for lawyers and
none for judges. At most there is a kind of inspectorate that sees that rules
are obeyed and forwards observed uncertainties and disputes about rules to
higher executive authority for resolution.
The new, open corporation is essentially a deal maker. Instead of taking
the form of internal directives, decisions are much more in the nature of
negotiated agreements with outsiders or quasi-outsiders. Although power
positions may be very unequal, many of these outsiders are at least
nominally independent and many of them really are. Common corporate
culture, common expertise, shared hierarchy, and even a common
expectation of future long-term relationships are often absent. In the
absence of such commonalities, principals are less likely to negotiate with
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one another and more likely to seek go-betweens who specialize in bridging
gaps between differing perspectives.
If two old-line General Motors (GM) automotive engineers in different
divisions needed to work out an agreement on a common engine block, they
did it themselves. If they came to an impasse, they kicked it upstairs to
their GM engineering superior. If a watch-the-bottom-line executive at the
Omnibus Corporation needs to decide whether the western clothing
franchises should be required to carry their own customer credit or factor it
to a bank partially owned by Omnibus's parent, a holding company, all of
that old-style GM intimacy is missing. (This tendency should not be
exaggerated. With the onset of the recession, many corporations began to
strip off some disparate divisions to concentrate on the central activities that
they knew best and thus could do most efficiently. In the process, some
movement back to a vertical structure occurred. On the other hand, the
recession also seems to have accelerated off-shoring and other forms of
subcontracting to lower-cost independents that move more operations from
internal to external status.) In this new world of external, disparate, one-ofa-kind deals, potentially the lawyer flourishes and the judge is sought far
more than in the vertically integrated, single product corporation. I say
"potentially" because in such a world, go-betweens and expert negotiators
are needed, as are instruments of coordination other than simple commands
and devices for conflict resolution other than hierarchy. But that does not
mean that lawyers, contracts, judges, and litigation are necessary. The
degree to which business relationships are legalized varies greatly among the
members of the global industrial and post-industrial economy.
It often has been claimed that from colonial times Americans have been
particularly litigious.5 Certainly lawyers have played a particularly large
role in American public life. It is also claimed that American business style
is particularly adversarial.6 The absence in America of an aristocracy, and
the absence of a small elite based on education in a handful of prestigious
institutions such as in England and France, the predominance of fee simple
ownership of small agricultural holdings over much of American history, the
multiplicity of governments, the relatively low level of cartelization of
industry and banking compared to Europe, the geographic dispersal of

5.

6.
(1989).

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 84 (1973).
See MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS ET. AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRODUCTIVE EDGE
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corporate headquarters, and the fact that the American political capital and
its business and culture capital are not in the same place, all may be factors
in the American propensity to deal through lawyer go-betweens.
When a handful of powerful men of common class background, who
were all literally at school together, who all live in the same neighborhood
of the same city and whose families intermarry, run the dozen or so major
industrial concentrations and the handful of financial giants that dominate
the national economy, and also control the nation's highly centralized
government, then there is little room for lawyer go-betweens, because there
is little desire for arms-length transactions. Business and government are
intimate affairs to be conducted by a small circle of intimates in a style of
muted, mutual accommodation that fits such a circle. This has traditionally
been the situation in most of the industrialized states other than the United
States. America may use so many lawyers in business and governmental
dealings less because we have a special affection for lawyers, than because
economic and political power has been widely dispersed among scattered,
disparate elites who cannot get together at their club or countryhouse,
because they do not have one, and who would find that they had little in
common upon which to build mutual trust even if they did have a meeting
place. Where there are no gentlemen, there have to be contracts, rather than
gentlemen's agreements.
Of course, the argument is one of degree. America has had the trusts,
and the Ivy League and Wall Street and the money aristocracy of
Vanderbilts, Carnegies, and Rockefellers, but it has had neither the degree
of concentration nor the degree of intimacy among the concentrators that has
existed in Europe.
Perhaps another rather mysterious chicken and egg dimension ought to
be added. Aside from the peculiar case of English solicitors, European
lawyers have had certain singular difficulties in serving business, particularly
big business, which American lawyers have not experienced. 7 From the
revival of the civil law in Italy, continental legal education and those who
received it were particularly tied to government service. Law as a body of
learning flowered quickly and massively because the possessors of that
learning proved to be ideal recruits for the bureaucracies that princes and
emperors were building as key instruments in the recentralization of political
7. See Yves Dezalay, Marchands de Droit (1991) (unpublished dissertation, tcole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris)).
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power after the dispersions of feudalism. The bulk and the best of the law
graduates entered government civil or judicial services. The remainder who
exercised their learning at all went to private practice; private practice itself,
however, particularly in the Latin countries, was viewed as a public office.
Lawyers were a kind of nobility of the robe holding independent positions
of honor from which legal advice was bestowed as a kind of public
benefaction from the learned to the unlearned. Until very recently in most
European countries, being an employee was incompatible with membership
in the bar.' Moreover, and again particularly in the Latin countries, the
traditional role of lawyer as orator survived from classic times. The lawyers
spoke in court for those not capable of speaking for themselves. Finally,
and paradoxically, while European law was far more noble than American,
in America law was concentrated in a set of professionals while in Europe
it was spread among the entire elite. American legal education, first by
apprenticeship and then by small, highly specialized, separate law schools,
produced lawyers, that is, persons who practiced law. In Europe, the bulk
of regular university degrees were in law or medicine. People with law
degrees were not lawyers, but jurists. Most did not practice law. Most who
did not enter government service entered the general world of affairs, not the
special practice of law.
The result was first that the European lawyer could not display quite the
enthusiasm for the getting and spending of trade that his plebeian American
counterpart was never embarrassed about. Business advising and contract
writing tended to be left to separate and lesser branches of the profession,
the advocate reserving himself for litigation. More importantly, European
lawyers have experienced great difficulty in adjusting to corporate business.
The corporation did not fit the image of the unlearned individual seeking a
benefaction and gratefully tendering an honorarium. The lawyer could not
be employed by a corporation, for employment was incompatible with bar
membership. Moreover, the corporation did not need to employ lawyers,
except for appearances in court, because nearly all of its executives who
were not technologically trained themselves had legal educations. But these
"in-house" legally trained persons felt and owed no allegiance to an
independent legal profession and its norms. They were not lawyers "in"

8.

THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra note

2, at 20-26.
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corporations, but corporate officers who happened to possess legal
learning.
Thus, the continental legal profession has been identified with the civil
service, distanced from the practice of business, unnecessary for day-to-day
corporate routine legal applications, and unwanted in the tight, interlocking
executive circles that coordinate inter-corporate affairs and corporate
relations with government.
As aforementioned, the exception has been the British solicitor who has
always been deeply involved in business. Yet the division between
barristers and solicitors, the higher prestige of the former, and their isolation
from day-to-day business advising and negotiation, leads to quite a different
situation than in America. Like their continental counterparts, British
business executives have been prone to intimate negotiations rather than
arms-length transactions. Solicitors may be skilled and wealthy, but they are
not quite at the appropriate status level. Barristers are, but only become
involved too late, that is, when litigation threatens. The British legal
profession is set at a slightly awkward angle to perform the kind of
corporate tasks done by the big American law firm that combines the
solicitor's intimate business knowledge with the barrister's clout.
Thus, viewed either as the result of peculiar American traits or peculiar
European ones, the intrusiveness of law, particularly in business dealings,
is often seen as particularly American and the globalization of this
intrusiveness as Americanization. European lawyers are now profoundly
interested in the growth of the large law firm, both the movement of
American firms into Europe and the increasing size of European firms. The
difficulties of continental lawyers in providing legal services to corporate
business are now being consciously addressed. Multi-national corporations
are moving toward demanding the incredibly detailed, completely
researched, contracts in Europe that they are accustomed to in the United
States. The growth of multi-nationals, the growth of European-wide
business, the movement of regulatory authority from national capitals to
Brussels, the incursion of foreign competition on former national quasicartels, the existence of flagship firms, etc., all reduce the intimacy of
business and business government dealings. The American style of more
arms-length, more legalized, business dealings is growing apace in Europe.
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II. GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC LAW
Certain global commonalities in law develop from a universal, and
apparently growing, popular distrust of government, or more precisely, of
bureaucratic discretion based on claimed expertise.9 The century from 1850
to 1950 is roughly the period of technocratic government.'" Bureaucracies
grew enormously in size and policy-making authority and were legitimated
on the basis of their technical expertise at accounting, war, engineering, and
the like. In the Leninist states, to be sure, the legitimating expertise has
been, in a sense, political, rather than technical. The party bureaucracy rules
because it knows the political truths of Marxism. Even in those states,
however, the government bureaucracy has consisted largely of engineers,
economists, agronomists, and other technicians. Although clearly ultimate
policy discretion in all states has to be wielded by some political
authority-the people, the party, the leader-most of the day-to-day activity
of government has become essentially a technical enterprise to be conducted
by experts in the various sciences and technologies, including the social
sciences and the science of public administration. In the United States, the
Progressive movement" and the New Deal 2 were central vehicles for the
acclaim of bureaucratic expertise. French and Prussian civil services
provided universal models. 3 Fascism also had a strong technocratic strain.
The allegedly inspired amateurism of the English and British imperial civil
services and the hysterical charisma of the Nazis may be counter-tendencies.
But behind the Nazis lurked the standard German civil servants. And even
the British civil services made their way more by accumulating "facts," and
claiming that they were the only ones who had all the facts, than simply by
asserting their superiority of class and literacy. The most dramatic recent
assertion of the superiority of technocratic government is to be seen in the

9.

Shapiro, supra note 3; MARTIN

SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? (1988).
DON K. PRICE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1962).
11. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1957).
12. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL (1970).

10.

13.

Fritz M. Marx, The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political

Development, in BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Joseph LaPalombara ed., 1963);
BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY MAKING: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW (Ezra N. Suleiman ed., 1984).
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European Community, where the Commission claims the central role in
Community policy making as a kind of technocratic juggernaut."
For a number of reasons, faith in technocracy waned after World War
II. In the West, experts began to be seen less as neutral truth seekers above
the fray of interest group politics and more as themselves, interest bearers
who sought their own advantages from government. The military-industrial
complex was the first technocracy denounced. The green movement then
discovered that the government agronomists, chemists, and foresters were
more like allies rather than restrainers of the evil, corporate, nature
destroyers-just as others had discovered earlier and announced in the
"capture" theory of regulatory agency behavior. 5 And finally, the vast
party and government bureaucracies of the Leninist states have been
overthrown far less because of a political revulsion against Marxism, than
because their claims of technocratic expertise have been proved false by the
virtual collapse of the production technologies that they are supposed to be
running.
The current post-audit being conducted of the economic,
environmental, and social devastation wrought by the largest bureaucracies
the world has ever seen necessarily has a global impact.
No one, however, proposes doing away with bureaucratic government
or even proposes that the defining characteristic of bureaucracies should
cease to be technical expertise. Instead, what is sought globally is increased
transparency of, and increased public participation in, bureaucratic decisionmaking. Because modem bureaucracies are indeed what Weber said they
are, rational-legal, 6 it seems obvious that law is an available instrument for
achieving greater transparency and participation. Globalization here refers
primarily to the industrialized states. In the period from roughly 1960 to
1990, the United States went through a virtual revolution in administrative
law.' 7 Much growth and innovation also occurred in Canada and
Australia. 8 It is alleged, although with little hard evidence, that English
administrative law revived in parallel fashion. 9 Very recently, the
14.

See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ch. 3 (1955).
16. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
17. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?, supra note 9.
18. G.G.L. Peiris, The Administrative Appeals Tribunal ofAustralia: The FirstDecade, 6 LEGAL
STUD. 303-24 (1986); Administrative Law: Past,Present & Future, 16 QUEEN'S L.J. 5-224 (1991).
19. E.C.S. WADE & A. W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at ix (10th
ed. 1985).
15.
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European Community has begun to experience a vivid urge to shop for new
legal devices to govern the work of the Commission. Of course, the postLeninist states are now desperately working to create a rule of law.
Globalization and Americanization go together here precisely because
the almost frantic pace of American innovation put the United States well
"ahead" of the rest of the world. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, American
federal courts, seconded by Congress, created an enormous new apparatus
of administrative law designed to maximize both the participation of interest
groups in the bureaucratic policy-making process and the obligation of
bureaucracies to make public every bit of their fact gathering, analysis, and
policy choice processes and to prove publicly their every claim of expertise.
Indeed, it may be argued that Americans went far beyond the point of
optimal returns in this crusade. Not only were enormous amounts of new
administrative law generated, but a steep level of increase in the vigor of
judicial supervision of bureaucracies was achieved. In a very real sense,
precisely because he was a layman rather than an expert trained in any of
the technologies that modem bureaucracies wield, the judge was set to watch
the technocrats. American judges of the 1940s and 1950s deferred to
bureaucratic expertise because the experts knew everything and the judge
nothing. By the 1980s, those same judges were demanding that the
bureaucrats fully, completely, and publicly explain what they were doing
and do so in such a way that the judge, a person totally devoid of
technological training and knowledge, could understand. It isclear that the
American felt need for transparency and is now felt across the industrialized
world. It is also clear that across that world attention is being paid to the
use of law to achieve those goals. It is not at all clear, but rather is a
subject of global debate, whether other nations should convert their judges,
as America did, from industrial fools to post-industrial heros.2 °
The promotion of the judge into the position of a kind of antibureaucratic hero may have been seen as part of what comparative politics
scholars speak of as a "legitimacy crisis."'" In democratic states, where
polling data can be somewhat trusted, there do appear to be rather long-term
and steep declines in public approval of government institutions. Such a
decline has obviously been precipitous in the post-Leninist sphere. From

20. See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 125-26; Martin Shapiro, Special Issue on Judicializationof
Politics, INT'L J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming).
21.

See G. BINGHAM POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (1982).
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another perspective, we are looking at the same phenomenon when we
observe the recent worldwide preoccupation with new written constitutions
dividing government powers and guaranteeing individual rights, the spread
of constitutional courts and constitutional judicial review, and the fervor and
effectiveness of the human rights movement. Here again, Americanization
and globalization partially overlap. The American constitutional experience,
including the Bill of Rights and judicial review, has appeared to be
singularly innovative and successful and thus serves as a world model. For
a time after World War II, as new constitutions with bills of rights and
judicial review appeared, it could be argued whether they were emulations
of the American model or simply the imposed products of American
conquest. But that particular hallmark of American constitutionalism,
constitutional judicial review, has certainly now come to flourish
endogenously in Germany and Italy.22 Even more notably, France, whose
legal and political culture has been most resistant to constitutional judicial
review and who was a World War II ally of the United States, not a
conquered enemy, now finds itself with an active constitutional court and a
constitutional bill of rights.2 3 The Court of Justice of the European
Community has turned itself into a constitutional court with human rights
jurisdiction, and that magic could hardly have been accomplished unless
constitutions and rights had become a European habit. 24 Even before that
the Western Europeans had created a Europe-wide bill of rights and a
European Court of Human Rights.25 The transmuted Eastern European
states have adopted constitutional judicial review almost automatically, as
have Asian post-Leninist states like Mongolia.
Constitutional judicial review lies at the convergence of two streams of
limitations on government. The first is the division of government powers,
the famous American "checks and balances." Of course, we will tend to
divide those government powers we fear the most. The framers of the U.S.
Constitution feared the legislature the most and divided it. The post-

22.

DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY (1989); Mary Volcansek, JudicialReview and Public Policy in Italy: American Roots and
the Italian Hybrid, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 89-105 (Donald W. Jackson

& C. Neal Tate eds., 1992).
23.

ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS (1992).

24. Weiler, supra note 14.
25. See Jochen Frowein et al., The Protection of Fundamental Human Rights as a Vehicle of
Integration, 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986).
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Leninist states fear the executive the most and tend to divide its transmuted
power between President and Prime Minister. Whenever a constitution
divides powers, it almost always necessitates a constitutional court to police
the boundaries. The French felt compelled to add a constitutional court
when, and only when, they felt compelled to divide executive authority
between a President and a Prime minister.
A second stream of government limitation is, of course, constitutional
guarantees of individual rights. You can have bills of rights without judicial
review. Indeed, many constitutions have some rights that are judicially
enforceable and others that are not. Nonetheless, the whole Western
tradition of rights is heavily law laden, and if rights are legal, it seems
appropriate that they be handled by courts. And if you prefer to have a
constitutional court anyway because you need somebody to police the
constitutional division of powers and/or the boundaries between central and
member states that occur in federalism, it becomes almost irresistible to give
that court rights jurisdiction as well. That is the story of the European
Court of Justice and the French Constitutional Council.26 The new Eastern
European states did not even have to decide which of the two, division of
powers or human rights, was the chicken and which the egg of constitutional
judicial review, so naturally did the two go together.
When we think of the global vogue in constitutional human rights as a
manifestation of a global distrust of government, the picture is easiest to see
for the so-called "negative" or conventional constitutional rights in which
the right is stated as a reserve of individual autonomy against government
interference. Freedom of speech, that is, the right to speak freely without
government censorship or fear of punishment by government, is an obvious
prototype. Post-World War II constitutions tend to be replete not only with
negative rights, but also with positive ones such as the right to education,
housing, health care, and employment. Here the demand is not that the
government stay out of things, but rather that it act positively to assure the
well-being of the citizens. Such constitutional provisions really exhibit the
same distrust of government. Nearly all of the nations in which pressure has
been experienced to put welfare rights in the constitution already have, or
clearly anticipate having, systems of economic and social rights secured by
statute. The push toward constitutionalizing these rights is far less a
26.

Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in EUROPOLMCS:

POLICYMAKING IN THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 123, 148-53 (Alberta Sbragia

INSTnruTIONS AND

ed., 1992).
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movement to endow government with new tasks than an expression of lack
of trust in legislatures to adequately fund and bureaucracies to adequately
implement mere statutory rights programs.

III.

GLOBALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE LAW

The constitutional rights movement is one aspect of a global movement
that goes beyond distrust of government to distrust of all hierarchical
authority and concentrations of power. The individual is seen as needing
protection from all the larger forces that threaten to crush him, not simply
from the governmental ones.27 Law is seen as one instrument for such
protection. Thus, in speaking of globalization, we move from the realm of
constitutional law to the more mundane realm of torts, product standards,
consumer protection, and occupational health and safety.28 Of course, most
legal systems around the world have always dealt with personal injury,
fraud, and shoddy goods. The industrial revolution brought together men
and man-maiming machines; Twentieth-Century technology generated the
most maiming of all, the automobile, plus a host of consumer goods so
complex that the rule of caveat emptor was no longer fair. The same may
be said for business organization and finance, areas where securities and
corporate governance law expanded to protect the investor. Globalization
here refers to a worldwide increase of legal protection against the ill effects
of technical, economic, and social devices too complex, distant, or powerful
to make individual self-protection possible. The most recent manifestation
of this movement is the great outburst of environmental protection law that
is partially fueled by a concern with nature itself but tends to achieve its
greatest impetus when that concern is coupled with putative injury to
individuals from pollutants.
Global patterns are, however, far from uniform here. The United States
has experienced a tort explosion.29
Many other nations have not.
American experience has not become global in this area, except as a
cautionary tale, in part because most other industrialized nations have more
developed systems of tax-supported health care and income maintenance that

27. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985).
28. See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalization Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L.
REv. 1 (1992).
29. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).
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reduce the impact on individuals of personal injuries. The American
securities market has also become a global cautionary tale, but one that is
generating a worldwide move to certain American securities law innovations,
such as the ban on insider trading. There has been an enormous, global
flood of product standards and other consumer protection law, but not only
are developments much faster in some nations than in others, but the
substantive standards and rules adopted also vary widely.
Perhaps globalization is clearest and most dramatic in environmental
law. As it became increasingly clear that the externalities of environmental
degradation crossed national boundaries and that some of them, like ozone
depletion, were truly global, parallel developments in national environmental
law accelerated as did efforts at multi-national and/or international
environmental protection law.3° Given the global uniformity of the
industrial technologies threatening the environment, a considerable
substantive uniformity emerges even in national environmental rules.
When we consider the collective impact of consumer protection
and
environmental law, a major potential conflict is identifiable between the
globalization of markets and the globalization of law. As various
movements toward free trade (such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the initial European Community treaties) break down tariff
barriers to global markets, the large numbers of differing national product
standards and rules on advertising and marketing intentionally or
unintentionally become final and often very effective barriers to global trade.
National economic sectors disadvantaged by global competition, which once
experienced all this consumer protection law as meddlesome government
regulation, now foster it as the last dike against the invasion of cheap and
shoddy foreign goods and services. Most of the action is directed at
vigorous enforcement of existing standards rather than the generation of new
ones because the existing random differences in national standards are what
serve as national trade boundaries.
The bonanza for those opposing globalization of markets lies in the new
concern for the environment, which hit at the same time as the movement
toward global markets. The sudden move to new, aggressive, and national
environmental laws can, in some instances, provide the perfect cover for
creating new legal barriers to trade to replace eroding tariff barriers. The
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growing recognition that differing national environmental regulations can
either deliberately or accidentally disrupt global markets then leads to a push
for transnational environmental regulation, which is added to the push
toward such regulation that comes from the perception of transnational
spillovers of environmental degradation costs.
Developments in the European Community provide a microcosm of
these potential global dynamics." The initial Community treaties attacked
tariffs in order to create, or at least aim at, a European quasi-customs
union. 32 Disadvantaged national economic sectors then retreated to
vigorous enforcement of national product standards, actively aided and
abetted by national customs bureaucracies who were about to lose their
missions and their jobs. Popular national support could be generated in the
name of the traditional national quality of beer or carving knives that could
not have been engendered in the name of tariff-protected higher prices. For
many years the principal political institution of European Community
building was the Court of Justice. In one of its most famous cases, it struck
at this new protectionism by announcing the Community law doctrine of
mutual recognition. 33 Each member of the Community must recognize the
product standards of every other so that products lawfully manufactured in
any member state must be admitted for sale in all of the others.34
Later, when national political and economic elites withiii the Community
concluded that they wanted to go forward in Community-wide market
building, this principle of mutual recognition became the cornerstone of the
Single Act, or "1992," agreement.35 Under the Single Act, by 1992 an
attempt would be made to harmonize, that is, enact Community-wide
product standards. All standards not harmonized were to be subject to the
rule of mutual recognition.
The political dynamic of globalization here is interesting. The Single
Act couples these provisions on product standards with new voting rules on
the Council, which must enact harmonized standards if there are to be any.
31. See Martin Shapiro, Federalism, FreeMovement and the Regulation-Averse Entrepreneur,in
NORTH AMERICAN AND COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM (Harry Scheiber ed., 1992); Shapiro, supra note 26,
at 123-56.
32. Thomas Heller and Jacques Pelkams, The FederalEconomy: Law and Economic Integration
and the Positive State-The US.A. and Europe Compared in an Economic Perspective, in 1
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 245-412 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1986).
33. Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
34. Id.
35. Single European Act 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter Single Act].
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Voting moves from a rule of member state unanimity to majority voting,
with each member state casting a number of votes roughly proportionate to
its proportion of Community population. Standing alone, the rule of mutual
recognition threatens a "race to the bottom." Whichever member state has
the lowest standards for a particular product should attract much of the
manufacturing of that product. But freed of single member state veto, the
Council is more capable of enacting harmonized regulations. It now has a
strong incentive to do so in order to avoid the rush to the bottom. Or, more
precisely, the states with the highest current stake in the manufacture of any
particular product have a strong incentive to push for Council harmonization
to avoid a race to the bottom, which they are likely to lose, while the threat
of moving to mutual recognition gives the less industrialized members a
bargaining chip in seeking more advantageous Community regional policy.
Thus, the threat of mutual recognition spurs market globalization, that is, in
this instance, Community-wide markets, by spurring the enactment of
Community-wide uniform product standards. For all the fuss over
Maastricht, the Single Act is now a working reality and major advances in
product standard harmonization have already occurred.36
Yet, at the same time the Single Act moves toward debilitating
consumer protection law as a trade barrier, it sets up a potential move to
environmental law as a trade barrier. The Single Act was drafted in the
midst of environmental enthusiasm and thus pushes two potentially
conflicting goals: economic growth and environmental protection. By
virtue of the Act, the Community itself acquires statutory recognition of
environmental powers it was already exercising. In addition, however,
specific provisions of the Act allow member states to enact more rigorous
environmental regulations than those of the Community as a whole, even if
such deviations from uniformity incidentally hamper free trade.37 These
provisions are, of course, worded in such a way that the Court of Justice
may strike down sham national environmental laws that are nothing more
than new trade barriers in disguise. But it is not always easy to unmask
such shams; many a national statute that severely limits trade might have
legitimate environmental goals, particularly since many national legislators
could have voted in favor of the law for environmental reasons as easily as

36. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 131-33; Renaud Dehousee, Integration v. Regulation? On the
Dynamics ofRegulation in the European Community, 30 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 383 (1992).
37. Shapiro, supra note 26, at 137-38.
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for economic ones. However, the danger is that many disadvantaged nations
will frequently dress demands for new economic protection in environmental
protection costumes.
Yet, here again the changes in voting rules on the Council, plus the
active Community environmental bureaucracy, create an interesting dynamic.
As national economic interests seize upon environmental loopholes in the
Single Act, free trade and environmental interests can both be protected
simultaneously by very rigorous, harmonized, Community-wide environmental standards that displace peculiar national ones.
IV. GLOBAL ACCELERATION OF LAW AND LAWYERS

Yet one more phenomenon that leads to talk of globalization is a steplevel increase in the sheer volume and penetration of law. The bureaucratic
state generates legal rules at a rate quite beyond the capacity of legislatures
or courts. The regulatory state keeps expanding its reach through law in
spite of talk of deregulation. The changes in Eastern Europe will result in
a vast new outpouring of regulatory law, because the social control of
economic enterprise, which in socialist states is achieved by internal
directives within the state ministries that "own" the enterprises, is achieved
by exterior, regulatory law when enterprise is privatized. The citizens of
modern democratic states expect their governments to cope with whatever
becomes defined as a social problem, from child abuse to the aging of
symphony audiences. When the government can cope, and even more when
it cannot, it passes a law as one step toward satisfying those demands.
Perhaps in the 1950s and 1960s the production of wealth appeared to be so
boundless that the welfare state could simply give money and services away
without constraining and rationing rules. The hated means tests would
disappear and welfare workers would provide social services to "clients"
rather than determine the eligibility of "applicants." By the 1980s, the
welfare state appeared to reach the limit of the resources of even the most
affluent states. Cost containment brings an avalanche of new rules to
replace the strategy of simply giving people as much as they ask for.
If the bureaucratic and regulatory welfare state manufactures legal rules
at an astounding rate and pushes them into more and more human
relationships, it may be argued that the private sector does not lag far
behind. There are more lawyers, more lawsuits, and more law talk all the
time. Newspapers and magazines now carry regular law sections next to
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their music sections. Everybody knows about the litigation explosion. The
crowd of lawyers becomes so prominent that it can serve as a target in
presidential campaigns. The number of lawyers and the size of law firms
expands exponentially.
It is notoriously difficult to achieve reliable data on litigation rates either
over time in one country, or comparatively between countries. It may well
be that there is no litigation explosion in relative terms, but it is only that
modem industrial states multiply so greatly the number of human
interactions that provide the potential for litigation, that the absolute amount
of litigation grows.3" With or without the litigation explosion, however,
there does seem to be an increased worldwide prominence of law, lawyers,
and judges in both private and public affairs.
This prominence may be the result of a host of developments that have
little direct relation to one another. One set of factors does interlock. If
bureaucratic and regulatory welfare states generate more and more legal
rules, if we are distrustful of bureaucracies so that we seek more
transparency and public participation in bureaucratic law making processes,
and we choose judicial review as a major mode of achieving transparency
and participation, then there will be a growth in judges and lawyers to
match the growth in bureaucracy. To say the same thing only slightly
differently, if we give individuals more legal rights to protect themselves
better against big public and private power holders, there will be a growth
of lawyers and courts to match the growth of rights. If we now wish to
protect every individual by law from every harm, then there will be such a
growth. As we multiply litigation opportunities in order to achieve greater
transparency, participation, and protection, those who lose economic, social,
or political struggles go to court to attempt to recoup their losses.
There are other causes of lawyer, judge, and court prominence that
appear to operate rather separately from this interlocking set. For instance,
the rapid expansion of European university education after World War II
and the sudden opening of law as a plausible education and career for
women led to a sudden surge in the total number of persons trained in the
law in the industrialized world during the 1970s and 1980s.
Is there a difference between more law, on the one hand, and more
lawyers, more legal costs, and more litigation, on the other? Because we
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want a more accountable bureaucracy, and more protection of individuals
from government, corporate power, and the general vicissitudes of modem
life and choose to achieve these goals through more finely knit legal fabrics,
must we necessarily accept the globalization of the U.S. style of adversary
legalism in which "have your lawyer see my lawyer" becomes the password
for every relationship, whether simplistic or intricate? I doubt that there can
be more law without more lawyers and more litigation. The globalization
of markets means a distancing of business relationships. The distrust of
bureaucracy, technology, and hierarchical authority and the concern for
protecting individuals from them creates another kind of distancing. Legal
rules are a standard and an almost irresistible mode of insuring the fairness
of distanced relationships. But if distrust of government is one of the very
generators of such rules, we can hardly put our faith in government
bureaucracies to enforce those rules either on themselves or on the business
community. The answer must be either self-enforcement or some neutral,
trusted, non-bureaucratic enforcer or some combination of the two. The
U.S. style of adversary legalism is precisely such a combination.39
Everyone hires a lawyer to construct and invoke protective rules, and when
irreconcilable disputes about the rules arise, resort is had to an apparently
neutral, non-bureaucratic, non-technocratic, non-hierarchical, non-power
pursuing third party-the judge.
Some nations, like Japan, may successfully pursue a policy of limiting
legalism by using draconian measures to shut their citizens off from lawyers
and courts. The globalization of markets, however, means that even in these
nations the many companies linked to international transactions will need
and acquire legal services, if necessary. Under such circumstances, it seems
unlikely that regimes that profess some level of democracy can keep lawyers
away from their domestic affairs indefinitely. The one exception, and of
course a very important one, is China. Chinese imperial law was the one
major legal system in the world in which a complex and theoretically allencompassing web of law was implemented almost without lawyers and
certainly without a private, professional bar.4" (The government legal
secretaries, although technically private employees of the magistrates, were
for all intents and purposes civil servants, and some of the officials of the

39. Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism andAmerican Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT.
369 (1991).
40. See DERK BODDE AND CLARENCE MoRRIs, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967).
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provincial appellate courts and the central ministry of punishments were
essentially professional lawyer-judges, although they had not received
specialized legal educations.) This legal tradition, combined with the
country's incredible size, population, and authoritarian regime, will almost
certainly allow China to enter global markets while shielding most of its
population from the globalization of law, unless it eventually experiences the
collapse of the regime that has overtaken other Leninist states.
The post-Leninist states will almost certainly experience major increases
in lawyers and litigation. In part, these increases will be a natural result of
movement from socialist to capitalist production, which, after all, is a move
from the most vertically integrated, internalized business enterprise of all to
a regime of externalized economic enterprise. But, in part, the increase will
occur as a conscious effort to build a private bar as an essential element in
reintroducing the rule of law to bureaucratic government. In spite of a
veneer of socialist legality, a central characteristic of Leninist regimes is the
discretion of a bureaucratized party melded with government bureaucratic
discretion in a way quite impervious to law. The government bureaucracies
were actually under no real obligation to obey the laws of the state or even
their own bureaucratically generated rules, although they were under a very
real compulsion to obey the discretionary directives of the party. One of the
central tasks of post-Leninist reconstruction is to introduce the fundamental
practice, which is almost taken for granted in the West, that requires public
officials to obey laws and their own rules and calls them to account when
they do not. Western consultants on law and constitutional organization
must remind themselves that Western institutions designed to achieve the
rule of law, such as judicial review, presuppose the existence of a
prosperous, active, private bar. Such bars will have to be created in parts
of Eastern Europe and Asia either from scratch, by building on the small
criminal defense bar, or by converting the large legal staffs of the now
obsolete procurators' offices into a private bar.
In Western Europe, large private bars already exist. What is new and
thus seen as "globalization" is the growth of large law firms, American and
domestic, in Europe. The more significant aspect of globalization, in the
sense of many lawyers and much litigation, is closely connected to the
globalization of law as an instrument to insure transparency and
accountability of bureaucracies.
As we have already noted, the strengthening of the European
Community has increasingly centralized and distanced government
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regulatory power in Brussels, and as a result there is increasing European
interest in increasing the transparency of, and public participation in, the
decisions of the new Eurocrats. 4' Europeans inquire about such U.S.
devices as independent regulatory commissions, the huge body of
administrative law generated by the courts out of the Administrative
Procedures Act and legislative oversight. Traditionally, European regulatory
style has tended to be closed, intimate, and consensual. Government
regulators, business leaders, and often union and local government leaders,
negotiated confidentially to a mutually agreed result. In contrast, American
regulatory style has tended to be confrontational, adversarial, public,
litigation oriented, and thus full of lawyers on all sides. Indeed, when it is
not, we suspect the regulators of having been "captured" and the public
interest having been betrayed. There is no question that the U.S. style has
achieved great transparency and participation (although perhaps at too high
of a cost in regulatory inefficiencies). Community participants are now
weighing the costs and benefits of the U.S. style. Certainly, Community
regulation is already generating new lawyer demand. Both as providers of
legal services and as lobbyists, lawyers are already playing a larger role in
Community regulatory affairs than they traditionally have played in the
national regulation undertaken by the member states. It may also be that the
shift from unitary to "federal" regulation entailed in the growth of the
Community also generates more lawyer demand because of the
multiplication of laws simultaneously applicable to a given transaction.
The shapers of the Community have themselves tended to multiply
litigation opportunities. The European Court of Justice for many years was
the most dynamic community building institution. Of course, it did its
community-building through the medium of litigation. Among its central
community building achievements has been the extension of the opportunity
to litigate Community law matters to private citizens through the "direct
effect" doctrine. The framers of the Community treaties themselves
carefully extended the opportunity to participate in Community litigation to
the lower as well as the highest national courts, through the "reference"
procedures of Art. 177.42 The Community has now established a court of

41. See Martin Shapiro, The US. Administrative ProceduresAct and the European Community,
in NIEUW EUROPEES CONSTITUTIONEEL REcHT (H.J. de Ru and J.A. Hofman eds., 1992).
42. See Shapiro, supra note 26.
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first instance alongside the Court of Justice.43 The Community reform
agenda now includes extending the jurisdiction of the court of first instance
to subject matters beyond those originally granted it, and thus inevitably
increasing the size of that court. (Because of the European tradition of
placing a large number of judges in a single court divided into "chambers"
and sitting in small panels, the number of judges and the opportunities for
litigation can be expanded almost indefinitely and almost invisibly by
simply creating more judicial positions on a given court rather than having
to create new courts. This device is also used in the "superior courts" of
many U.S. cities and counties and in the lower federal courts.)" To some
unknown degree, whether government regulatory style becomes more
confrontational and litigious depends upon the propensity of judges to
second-guess agencies. (There is, of course, a chicken-and-egg problem.
Judicial propensity may increase as litigation increases, as well as viceversa.) That propensity waxes and wanes at various times in various
countries and perhaps for quite different reasons. It is all something of a
mystery. Even within Europe, German administrative courts appear to be
more active reviewers than do French, and it is unclear whether English
judges have lately really become more active or whether this is just wishful
thinking among English administrative lawyers. The stage is now set in the
Community for a major growth in lawyering and litigation in the regulatory
sphere, but as yet we do not know much even about the first act, let alone
how the play will end.45
It is sometimes claimed that the various urges and movements I have
enumerated, such as the growth of administrative law to achieve bureaucratic
transparency and participation, and the growth of law protective of the
individual, add up to a massive and generalized, global "legalism"-to the
deeper penetration of law, litigation, and lawyers into every aspect of social
life. Cartoon children who used to be captioned "I say it's spinach and I
say the hell with it" are now depicted as announcing "I say it's spinach, and
I'm going to sue for child abuse." It is alleged, particularly in the United
States, but in Europe as well, that the politics of the ballot box are

43. Emile Noel, The Transformation of the European Community, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT L L.J.
514, 553 (1992).
44. See J. CULVER AND HAROLD STUMPF, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1992); cf DEBORAH
BARROW AND THOMAS WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
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increasingly supplanted by the politics of litigation, especially by those who
would lose at the ballot box if they openly announced their purposes and
sought popular support.4 6 A plague of lawyers emerge from the law
schools and settle in an increasingly populated profession that feeds on the
ever higher transaction costs that lawyers themselves generate.
All of this must be taken with more than a grain of salt. It is extremely
difficult to establish either baseline data or current data on litigation rates,
let alone on the far more intangible matter of the intensity of penetration of
law into the social fabric. Given the enormously accelerated rate of human
interaction resulting from the communications and information revolutions,
it is not at all clear that legal transaction costs have increased relative to the
total value of the transactions. In politics, all but the very stupid go to
whatever part of government will help them, including courts. People may
be going to government more for help, but it is not at all clear that they are
going disproportionately more to courts. In much of the world, there has
been less actual new judicialization of politics than there has been greater
new understanding of the political role that courts have always played. This
new understanding is partly a result of the spread of U.S. scholarship on the
politics of courts and partly the result of changes in the public awareness of
judicial policy-making. For instance, in shaping and reshaping the common
law, British judges have always played an enormous role in creating British
economic and social policy. Nevertheless, the politics of the judiciary was
submerged in part because the judges acted in private and technical
"lawyers' law" spheres that did not appear to be of public concern. We now
hear much of the politics of the English judiciary, since English judges are
now more often involved in public law matters due to a greater body of
public law.
Perhaps it is not best to seek to deal with a global legalism, that is, a
global growth in the general pervasiveness of law, given that we do not
know, and probably cannot know, whether it has occurred. It is probably
the better part of valor and scholarship to deal with the few particular
common developments and the many particular parallel developments in law
across the globe that we can more precisely isolate and observe.
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V. GLOBALIZATION OF LAW AND THE GROWTH OF U.S. LAW
We have been looking at the globalization of law along a number of
vectors. The global distrust of hierarchical authority and concentrated public
and private power generates growth in administrative law, constitutional, and
other rights law, and in legal regulation of economic enterprise. The global
desire to protect the individual generates growth in personal injury,
consumer protection, environmental law, and even family law. The
globalization of markets and business enterprise generates the growth of a
worldwide law of business transactions. The global multiplication of
exterior business relationships and the growth of arms-length regulatory
styles fuel a growing demand for lawyers and their involvement in more and
more social, economic, and political relationships. Frequently, we have
encountered a certain overlap between globalization and Americanization.
While in some instances U.S. responses to various global needs may
have served as models to be diffused, in others our experience may well be
a cautionary tale involving the traditional U.S. vice of excess. We may have
too much distrust of governmental and corporate power, too much rights
talk, too much adversarial, confrontational regulation, too much
administrative and constitutional law, and indeed too much law, lawyers,
and litigation in general. U.S. legal experts are rushing into the postLeninist states to help them establish the rule of law. The European
Community inquires about American regulatory style. Business firms
everywhere look to the legal services provided by the big American-style
law firm. All this occurs at the very time that U.S. citizens are increasingly
uneasy about "too many lawyers" and "too much litigation."
Let us briefly mount a small, demonstrative parade of horribles. As
other nations look for legal devices to insure more transparency and
participation in government decision-making, must we not honestly testify
to them that the administrative law and adversary legal system that has
developed in the United States in the realm of government regulation has
become pathological, endlessly delaying regulatory decisions and ultimately
reducing their transparency by increasing their complexity 4 7 As all the
world talks of human rights, must we not inform the world that transforming
social problems into rights issues and thus empowering courts over
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electorally responsible political leaders has not been an unblemished success
in the United States and has not resulted in the courts solving most of the
social problems assigned to them? 8 As all nations seek to protect their
citizens from the potential harms with which modem industrial societies
surround them, must we not admit that some of our environmental and
consumer protection legislation has turned into mere binges of anti-corporate
hatred that end up diverting scarce resources to their least important
protective uses or that simply collapse of their own ambitions?49 Think of
Superfund and product safety standards. Our tort regime already provides
a horror story that is known worldwide."
Should we be particularly
anxious to export our free-wheeling, open, lawyer-lubricated style of
corporate development in light of the junk bond and savings and loan
scandals? Ought we warn outside emulators that the large U.S. law firms
may be about to implode as a result of having committed themselves to
practices that generate geometric growth rates that cannot be sustained
indefinitely?5 1 Should not our corporations warn their transnational
brethren to control their legal costs, as U.S. corporations are beginning to
do?
In telling the stories of globalization of markets and of politics, my
colleagues may be able to speak of both large opportunities and large threats
for U.S. society. One aspect of the globalization of law, the worldwide
adoption of certain aspects of U.S. style law as applied to business
transactions, certainly provides opportunities for U.S. lawyers, particularly
those in the large law firms. The globalization of environmental law may
pose large threats to the United States economy because, as the largest and
most profligate national industrial entity, the United States must be the
principal regulatory target. Certain moves toward internationally uniform
and enforceable bodies of law, such as the law of intellectual property,52
entail potentially great costs and benefits for U.S. interests. Differing
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regulatory regimes impose differing production costs on enterprise so that
national deregulation or the export of high regulatory standards may provide
opportunities for U.S. economic advantage or disadvantage over its
international competitors.
On the whole, however, the globalization of law is for U.S. citizens less
a matter of opportunities and threats than simply one of prospectives, at
least in the short and medium run. For all the internationalist talk, it
remains true now, as it long has, that law and the political structures that
produce and sustain it are far more national and far less international than
are trade and politics as such. There are more nations now than there have
ever been and more are emerging daily. The tendency toward finer and
finer ethnic political subdivision is one of the most striking features of the
new global politics and is probably being accelerated by the expansion of
global markets. But the global result in law is more nationally and locally
distinct, not necessarily more globally common law. If the Mongolians
produce television sets, our economy may have to do something about it.
But if they produce new constitutional provisions protecting the rights of
their Kazak minority, chances are our laws need not do anything about it.
If their efforts fail and their ethnic minority seeks independence or
absorption by Kazakhstan, then our politics may have to do something about
it, but our law will still be untroubled. In short, I would argue that our
domestic legal regime may have to respond to global changes in markets
and in politics far more often than to global changes in law.
For the most part, national regimes of law and lawyering will remain
self- generating. They will be self-generating, however, in response to
certain aforementioned globally perceived needs, such as the need to limit
technocratic-bureaucratic discretion. Thus, U.S. lawyers and lawmakers may
find comparative legal studies more fruitful than they have in the past.
There may be somewhat more rapid legal borrowing and diffusion among
national legal systems than there has been in the past. But, except in certain
special areas, which no doubt will be the duty of globalization of law
specialists to identify, the American agenda of legal change will continue to
be built largely out of domestic legal materials. It may be true that a certain
degree of U.S. style law is a real feature of the globalization of law. It is
highly unlikely, however, that the traffic will flow equally in both directions,
that there will be much Europeanization, let alone Asianization or
Africanization of U.S. law. For the United States, globalization of law will
be much more a matter of parallel development than of direct borrowing or
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response. Again, I must emphasize that the globalization of markets and of
the politics of the environment may indeed drive much legal change in the
United States, but most of the change is likely to come from domestic,
rather than global, legal materials.
The enormous costs and failures of the U.S. style of adversary legalism
are coupled with the continued American enthusiasm for rights and our
continued derogation of political authority, most recently evidenced by the
popularity of legislative term limitations. This dynamic sets the agenda for
legal change in the United States. It is highly unlikely that we will respond
to the pathologies of legalism by moving toward less law, although just
possibly we may move toward fewer courts or less active court intervention
in policy-making. Alternative dispute resolution and judicially facilitated
settlement are much bruited. We may have passed the peak of judicial
policy-making in both constitutional and administrative judicial review. Yet,
most reforms are likely to move toward different, rather than less, law. In
shaping legal reform, it may be of some help to appreciate that certain
phenomena are now globally common and generate globally parallel legal
responses. We may have increasing confidence that the successes and
failures of legal innovations in country A will be predictive for country B.
In certain special areas of law, globally common and globally enforceable
rules are beginning to emerge. For the most part, however, U.S. law will
indubitably continue to resemble traditional U.S. law, generated by domestic
responses to perceived domestic problems, although many of those domestic
problems are generated by our global interrelationships. The whole world
marches into the international future with its feet firmly planted in the ever
more fertile soil of nationalism, as a glance at any day's newspaper will
make clear. Studies of globalization of law will depend as much on a subtle
appreciation of differences among peoples of the globe as on similarities.

